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TAXING POSSESSION OF
FEDERAL PROPERTY
Carroll H. Smith*
California's recent attempt to expand its common property tax
base may be of interest to tax administrators of other states con-
templating similar excursions. The project started many years ago,
but culminated in 1959 with an attempt by the counties of the
state to tax the possessory interest in federally-owned, tangible
personal property in the hands of private contractors.
Since 1859 California case law has recognized a taxable
possessory interest in tax-exempt land.' A possessory interest in im-
provements on tax-exempt land was held taxable in 1866.2 With the
enactment of the Field Codes of 1872 the possession or right to
possession, as distinguished from ownership, of land and improve-
ments became taxable.' Not until 1895 was the taxation of a
possessory right in exempt land specifically recognized by the
codes.4 In 1921 the code first provided for taxing improvements on
tax-exempt land.5
HISTORY: THE PROBLEM OF VALUING POSSESSORY INTERESTS
Except for these statutory provisions and section 1, article
XIII of the California constitution, which directs that all property
be taxed unless specifically exempt, county assessors were left to
their own devices as to methods of valuation of any taxable
possessory interest in exempt land and improvements. They could
refer to the following statutory definitions of property for tax
purposes: real property includes land and improvements; improve-
ments include fixtures; fixtures include trade fixtures; and whatever
is not real estate is personal property.'
* B.A., University of California, 1918; LL.B., McGeorge College of Law, 1931.
Member, California and United States Supreme Court Bars. Professor of Law, Uni-
versity of San Diego. Former Chief Trial Deputy District Attorney and County
Counsel, San Diego County.
1 California v. Moore, 12 Cal. 56 (1859).
2 People v. Shearer, 30 Cal. 645 (1866).
8 CAL. POL. CODE § 3617 (Deering 1885).
4 CAL. POL. CODE § 3820, as amended, Cal. Stats. 1895, ch. 218, § 86, p. 331.
5 CAL. POL. CODE § 3820, as amended, Cal. Stats. 1921, ch. 268, § 2268, p. 370.
6 CAL. REv. & TAX. CODE §§ 103, 104, 105, 106; See generally, Trabue Pittmen
Corp. v. County of Los Angeles, 29 Cal. 2d 385, 175 P.2d 512 (1946).
TAXING POSSESSION
Not until 1932 did the supreme court of the state prescribe a
formula for assessing possessory interests in exempt land and im-
provements. In Blinn Lumber Co. v. Los Angeles County' the
court considered three orthodox methods of evaluation: (1) re-
placement cost, (2) market value, and (3) income analysis. It
decided that the income analysis method was best adapted to assess
value of the property involved, which was a leasehold interest in
tax-exempt land. To ascertain the value of the possessory interest,
imputed net income, not actual income, was computed for the
remainder of the life of the lease and reduced to present worth.
The method was faulty because it permitted the taxpayer,
when computing his net income stream for capitalization, to deduct
from gross income the rent charge as an operating expense. Since
the Blinn case was confined on its facts to possessory interests in
exempt land which did not include improvements, the method of
valuation was a hazy guide to assessors. It was followed, however,
in San Diego and other counties until overruled in 1955.8
In 1939 the California tax laws were recodified in the Revenue
and Taxation Code, which became effective February 1, 1941. At
the same time the Legislature enacted the first possessory interest
law. The new law reinstated the provisions of section 3820 of the
old Political Code which defined possessory interest as "possession
of, claim to, or right to the possession of land or improvements,
except when resulting from ownership of the land or improvements"
and "taxable improvements on tax exempt land." The new section
also provided that "possessory interests shall not be considered as
sufficient security for the payment of any taxes." Even today
Revenue and Taxation Code section 107 defines a taxable possessory
interest in tax-exempt land and improvements only and does not deal
with such interests in personal property.
THE FIRST ATTEMPT TO TAX POSSESSION OF EXEMPT PERSONALTY
In February 1943 the California District Court of Appeal for
the first time passed on the question of whether there could be a
taxable possessory interest in tax-exempt personal property. In
Douglas Aircraft Co. v. Byram' ° a prime contractor constructing air-
planes and spare parts for the federal government possessed work-
in-process and inventories, whose title had passed to the United
7 216 Cal. 468, 474, 14 P.2d 512, 516 (1932).
8 De Luz Homes, Inc. v. County of San Diego, 45 Cal. 2d 546, 290 P.2d 544
(1955).
9 CAL. REV. & TAx. CODE § 107.
10 57 Cal. App. 2d 311, 134 P.2d 15 (1943).
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States when it made partial payment. The court held that no taxable
possessory interest existed in the property. The property had none
of the characteristics of property for tax purposes "judged by any
standard of which we have knowledge." In addition the contractor
was exercising no "usufructuary right" in the property, since he was
permitted to make use of the planes and parts only
for the benefit of their owner, the Federal government, and not for
the benefit of the plaintiff. The fact that the plaintiff was to be
paid for fabricating a plane out of the government's material does
not change its use of the material from a use for the government
to a use for the plaintiff. Plaintiff's compensation becomes due
because it makes use of the materials and partially completed planes,
not for itself, but for the government."
The court further noted that its decision was not based on section
107 of the California Revenue and Taxation Code, which confined
taxable possessory interests to real property only, since the section
had not taken effect until after the taxes in issue had become a lien.
No hearing was sought in the supreme court of the state. The
defendant county hoped that the decision, if ignored, would go
away.
A NEW VALUATION DEVELOPS IN THE LAND CASES
Four years later, in September 1947, the California Supreme
Court came to the assistance of the county assessors when it ap-
proved a formula for the assessment of possessory interests in
tax-exempt land and improvements. In Kaiser Co. v. Reid 2 the
United States furnished government-owned land, with improvements
constructed by the contractor, to the contractor. Title remained in the
government under a "Facilities Contract," which allowed the con-
tractor to occupy the property under a revocable permit. He then
used the property to perform his contractual obligations to the
government.
The assessment formula submitted for the court's approval
was substantially the same as the one approved in Blinn for evalua-
tion of land. But an entirely new approach was developed for
assessing the possessory interest in improvements. After setting
out these formulae, the court paused only to comment that they
had been "judicially approved in cases presenting analogous
considerations," citing the Blinn case.'" The court then stated that
11 Id. at 317, 134 P.2d 15, 18 (1943).
12 30 Cal. 2d 610, 184 P.2d 879 (1947).
18 The court also cited Hammond Lumber Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 104
Cal. App. 235, 244-45, 285 Pac. 896, 900-01 (1930) and Underwood Typewriter Co.
v. City of Hartford, 99 Conn. 329, 122 At. 91, 94 (1923).
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the issue was not the amount of the assessment, i.e., whether there
was an overcharge because of the method of valuation employed,
but whether the possessory right had any value. The decision in
Kaiser was important for the assessors of the state for three
reasons: (1) While not overruling, it distinguished the Douglas
case, which dealt with personal property; (2) it forecast the United
States Supreme Court decisions; and (3) it furnished a precise
formula for assessing a possessory interest in tax-exempt
improvements.
The Kaiser formula directs the assessor to take four basic
steps to value the possessory interest in an improvement.
1. Ascertain original cost of the improvement, its purchase or
acquisition date and its estimated useful life. Depreciate original
cost down to tax day (date of appraisal) to determine present
worth.
2. From the estimated termination date of the term of posses-
sion determine the reversionary value of the property. Reduce this
reversionary value to its present worth by application of the present
value factor.
3. Subtract the present value of the reversion from the present
worth of the improvement. From this figure deduct a reasonable
percentage for risk and hazard. The resulting figure is the appraised
or market value of the contractor's possessory interest.
4. To ascertain assessed value, apply the uniform percentage
ratio of assessed to market value used for all property in the county.
After the 1947 decision in Kaiser Co. v. Reid six years passed
without significant change. But the counties were never satisfied
with the Douglas case, which had not been appealed to the supreme
court of the state. The counties reasoned that Alabama v. King &
Boozer 4 supported the view that the right kind of nondiscriminatory
property tax on the possessory interest in federally-owned personal
property in private hands for profit would be constitutional. After
all, the California Supreme Court for thirty-six years (from 1859
to 1895) had recognized a possessory interest tax on exempt land
and improvements with no support but the constitutional mandate
that all property in the state be taxed unless specifically exempt.
This the court did even before the Legislature expressly directed
such a tax. No good reason appeared why the court could not do
the same with respect to exempt personal property. County
assessors could then carve the tangible possessory interest out of
14 Alabama v. King & Boozer, 314 U.S. 1 (1941).
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the fee and assess it, leaving untouched the reversionary interest in
the exempt property. This should be possible even though section
14, article XIII was amended in 1933 to give the Legislature the
power to classify and exempt personal property for tax purposes.
THE NEW FORMULA Is APPLIED TO POSSESSION OF PERSONALTY
The real difficulty, it was argued, was a practical one. What
method of valuation was to be used in assessing this new tax base?
No better constitutional approach to valuation could be found than
the formula applied to exempt improvements in Kaiser Co. v. Reid.5
Accordingly, in fiscal year 1953-54 Los Angeles and San Diego coun-
ties took the initiative and began assessing contractors' possessory
interests in federally-owned, tangible personal property and con-
tinued to do so until fiscal year 1958-59.
The next development in California law came in 1955 with
De Luz Homes, Inc. v. County of San Diego6 and three companion
cases from Solano, San Bernardino, and Orange counties. In these
cases housing projects had been constructed on United States
military reservations under the Wherry Act. 17 Title to the buildings
passed to the United States on completion of the projects. The gov-
ernment then gave long-term leases to private contractors, and the
counties assessed these leasehold interests. The assessed lessee
claimed certain deductions, including amortization of investment
and rent, attempting to reduce the assessed value to zero. The
court disallowed these deductions and in an exhaustive opinion not
only overruled the Blinn case but set out a precise guide for assess-
ment of possessory interests in exempt real property. The court
stated that while actual income should be used in the income
analysis of the leasehold in question, imputed income might be used
in appropriate cases.
LEGISLATIVE RETALIATION TO THE DE Luz DECISION
Shortly after the De Luz decision Congress passed an amend-
ment to the National Housing Act.' 8 It provided in substance for
an offset or deduction from federal aid advanced to any taxing or
public agency assessing a tax against a lessee of the govern-
ment under a Wherry Act housing project prior to June 15, 1956,
15 30 Cal. 2d 610, 184 P.2d 879 (1947).
16 45 Cal. 2d 546, 290 P.2d 544 (1955).
17 12 U.S.C. §§ 1748-1748h.
18 Public Health & Welfare Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1594 (1958), as amended, 70 Stats.
1956 ch. 1028, § 511, p. 1110.
[Vol. 4
TAXING POSSESSION
which was still unpaid. Congress was retaliating against the De Luz
and similar decisions19 throughout the country. San Diego County
believed the federal legislation to be an unconstitutional attempt at
retroactive exchange of foreign commodities for local taxes and
decided to disregard it until tested in the appellate courts of the
state. A test case was filed prior to 1958 in San Diego County, but
was settled in compromise by stipulated judgment in 1959.
On the local level opponents of the De Luz decision also
retaliated. In 1957 they persuaded the California Legislature to
amend the Revenue and Taxation Code2" so as practically to nullify
De Luz. Revenue and Taxation Code section 107.1 was added in
order: (1) to declare possessory interest leaseholds in tax-exempt
land to be personal property, so that the Legislature could exempt
them from taxation (the Legislature could not constitutionally exempt
realty from taxation); (2) to provide for a lower tax on leases
created prior to the effective date of De Luz by applying to them
the Blinn method of evaluation, which allowed deductions for rent.
The De Luz decision was left to operate only on leases executed
after its effective date, which was December 25, 1955. The consti-
tutionality of this legislation was doubtful, since only the constitution
and not the Legislature can exempt real property from taxation.
Possessory interests in land and improvements have always been
classified as real property.
21
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE LAW Is QUESTIONED
The Attorney General of the state and the County Counsels
of Los Angeles and San Diego held this statute unconstitutional and
void in opinions to their constituents. 2 They advised that it be
disregarded by assessors until brought to test in the appellate
courts of the state. The prerequisite steps toward such litigation
were taken in San Diego County, and test cases were immediately
launched in Los Angeles County.
23
. The issue of taxable possessory interests in exempt personal
property was again raised in 1957 in C. C. Moore & Co. Engineers
19 See Offut Housing Co. v. County of Sarpy, 351 U.S. 253 (1956).
20 Cal. Stats. 1957, ch. 211, § 1, p. 3747.
21 San Pedro, Los Angeles, & Salt Lake R.R. v. City of Los Angeles, 180 Cal.
18, 179 Pac. 393 (1919); Bakersfield & Fresno Oil Co. v. Kern County, 144 Cal. 148,
77 Pac. 892 (1904).
22 Ops. CAL. ATT'Y GEN. 17 (1958).
23 Forster Shipbuilding Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 54 Cal. 2d 450, 353 P.2d
736, 6 Cal. Rptr. 24 (1960) ; Texas Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 52 Cal. 2d 55, 338
P.2d 440 (1959).
1964]
SANTA CLARA LAWYER
v. Quinn.24 Private contractors under contract with the cities of
Burbank, Glendale, and Los Angeles had in their possession com-
ponent parts of boiler plants, which on tax day were not yet fabri-
cated into the finished product. The contractors' possessory interests
were assessed. Two of the contracts were silent on the passage of
title to the exempt cities, while in the other it was clear that title
passed on delivery to the site. The court held that since legal title
or beneficial ownership had passed in all cases to the exempt
agencies, there was no taxable possessory interest in the property.
The California Supreme Court denied a hearing.
Further issues were raised during Los Angeles County's six
years of assessing possessory interests in personal property. Two
test cases25 were launched attacking these assessments, and by
1958 these cases were pending before the California Supreme
Court. Factually the two cases presented almost every kind of
property thus far encountered in this type of litigation: government-
owned land, buildings, both moveable and affixed machinery and
equipment, tools and tooling, jigs and dies. Some property was
furnished to the contractor by the government to aid performance,
while other personalty was acquired by the contractor with title
passing to the government under terms of the contract. Almost
every type of government contract was involved, from cost-plus-a-
fixed-fee and fixed price contracts of various kinds with prime
contractors and sub- and sub-sub-contractors, to research contracts
where the end product bargained for consisted of a written report.
Both the Douglas and Moore cases were vigorously attacked in
these appeals, and their disapproval and reversal by the supreme
court of the state was sought for the first time by the county. Similar
suits were filed in San Diego County, but by tacit consent of the
parties were left to await the results in the two Los Angeles County
cases.
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONS
This was the situation in California in March 1958 when the
United States Supreme Court handed down four landmark deci-
sions.20 There was much speculation as to the impact of these
24 C. C. Moore & Co. Engineers v. Quinn, 149 Cal. App. 2d 666, 308 P.2d 781
(1957).
25 General Dynamics Corp. v. County of Los Angeles, 51 Cal. 2d 59, 330 P.2d
794 (1958) ; Aerojet General Corp. v. County of Los Angeles, 51 Cal. 2d 59, 330 P.2d
794 (1958).
26 American Motors Corp. v. City of Kenosha, 356 U.S. 21 (1958), per curiam
affirming, 274 Wis. 315, 80 N.W.2d 363 (1957); City of Detroit v. Murray Corp.,
355 U.S. 489 (1958); United States v. Township of Muskegon, 355 U.S. 484 (1958);
United States v. City of Detroit, 355 U.S. 466 (1958).
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decisions on the California situation, particularly the General
Dynamics and Aerojet General cases pending before the California
Supreme Court. It seemed clear to the counties that the federal
immunity question was finally resolved in their favor by these
Michigan and Wisconsin cases. The Supreme Court had decided
that a state has a taxable property right in government-owned,
tangible personal property in the possession and use of a private
contractor. The Court reached this conclusion even though the
state statute may not have specifically recognized such a tax base.
If the tax was nondiscriminatory, it did not matter how the right
of possession might be evidenced,, whether by lease, permit, or
contract. Such a tax was assessable to the contractor at full cash
value of the property, as though owned in fee.
The counties assumed that the decisions would influence the
California Supreme Court's decision on the two Los Angeles cases
pending before that court. They believed the state supreme court
would find it difficult to reconcile Douglas and Moore with these
latest pronouncements of the United States Supreme Court. The last
word on the question of immunity of federally-owned property
from taxation by the states seemed to have been spoken.
Some were more cautious, however. California had long since
developed the concept that the possessory interest value of land
and improvements (and this goes to the tax base) is something
less than the fee, except in the case of the long-term lease where
there may be no reversionary value to be returned to the exempt
lessor. This concept had been born of too hard and prolonged a
struggle to be lightly forsaken for the sudden enrichment of
personal property tax base now offered by the Supreme Court de-
cisions. Warnings had sounded from the Supreme Court in the
Kern-Limerick, Inc. v. Scurlock27 and United States v. County of
Allegheny28 cases, which clearly stated that the government's inter-
est in property must be left untouched. By a stroke of the contract
pen the private contractor may be made a mere purchasing agent
for the government, thus exempting the entire property from any
state taxation. It was further pointed out by more pessimistic souls
that the lure of new and fabulous riches29 to enrich the distressed
local tax base might blind county assessors to a vital fact: not only
the Congress but also the California Legislature could at will
declare this personal property entirely exempt from taxation. The
California Constitution was amended in 1933 to permit the Legis-
lature to do just this.8"
27 347 U.S. 110 (1954).
28 322 U.S. 174 (1944).
29 34 Wis. L. REv. 190, 207, 208, note 95 (1959).
30 CAl.. CONST. art. XIII, § 14.
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THE CALIFORNIA BATTLE ENDS
The answer was not long in coming. On October 24, 1958, the
California Supreme Court handed down its decisions in General
Dynamics8 and Aerojet General.2 To the dismay of the counties
the court declined to follow the four United States Supreme Court
decisions and held that California must have a specific statute
authorizing the tax. No hearing from this ruling was ever sought in
the United States Supreme Court. Instead the counties elected to
go to the Legislature for aid.
Los Angeles and San Diego Counties collaborated on a bill8
providing for an optional tax on the property, to be levied at the
discretion of each county, and introduced the measure at the 1959
regular session of the California Legislature. The bill passed the
Assembly but was killed in the Senate Revenue and Tax Committee
through the vigorous opposition of the California Manufacturers
Association, the California aircraft companies, and the United
States Department of Defense.
Following this blow to the counties, the California Supreme
Court handed down decisions 4 on the validity of section 107.1 of
the California Revenue and Taxation Code. The cases held that
the Legislature could not constitutionally exempt possessory interests
arising out of leases in exempt land and improvements from
taxation, since they were real property, but that it could confine the
De Luz decision to prospective operation only. To apply it retro-
actively to leases executed prior to its effective date of December
25, 1955, would result in too great an economic burden to the
lessees affected.
CONCLUSION
California's experience leads to several conclusions. Until the
states can present a united front to the federal government, the
local tax base cannot be enlarged at the expense of government
contractors or lessees without fear of reprisal from federal agencies
in the form of withdrawn federal subsidies. Further, until each
state can overcome within its own borders the powerful argument
31 General Dynamic Corp. v. County of Los Angeles, 51 Cal. 2d 59, 330 P.2d
794 (1958).
82 Aerojet General Corp. v. County of Los Angeles, 51 Cal. 2d 59, 330 P.2d
794 (1958).
88 A.B. 487.
84 Forster Shipbuilding Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 54 Cal. 2d 450, 353 P.2d
736, 6 Cal. Rptr. 24 (1960); Texas Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 52 Cal. 2d 55, 338
P.2d 440 (1959).
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that to insist upon this desperately needed local tax is to create an
unfriendly climate for business, the chances are remote that the
states will ever prevail in their struggle. But the tax base potential
is there and waiting, over 222 billion dollars of it. We know that
it is attainable, thanks to the enterprise of Michigan and Wisconsin.
But the words of John Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland" still
cast their shadow: "The power to tax is the power to destroy."
The federal government has clearly indicated that it is not prone
to let itself be destroyed by excessive taxation of its contractors.
85 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
